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Readers who have followed this discussion between Professor Goble
and Father Kenealy will welcome this article as a concise statement of
the scholastic position on the natural law, together with a clarification
of its concepts and terminology.
SCHOLASTIC NATURAL LAW-
Professor Goble's Dilemma
WILLIAM J. KENEALY, S.J.*
P ROFESSOR GEORGE W. GOBLE wrote a challenging and significant
article, entitled Nature, Man and Law: The True Natural Law,1
which was criticised by the present writer's Whose Natural Law?2 To
this criticism Professor Goble has replied in his The Dilemma of the
Natural Law.3 The dilemma indicated in the title is expressed in the
following words:
The universality and immutability of principles of law can either be
determined by objective evidence or they cannot. If they can be so deter-
mined, the whole body of natural law becomes a system of empirical law.
If they cannot be so determined, then objective evidence cannoi be used to
show the validity of one system over another claiming the same attributes.
This is the dilemma of the natural law.4 (Italics supplied.)
The gist of my reply to this dilemma is that, conceding the second horn,
I deny the first. The reason why I deny the first horn of the dilemma is
because it assumes that objective evidence is confined solely to empirical
data. It implies that we can have objective evidence only of physical facts
adduced by the senses; and that we cannot have objective evidence of
metaphysical truths perceived by the intellect. Since the physical sciences
themselves depend upon the validity of certain metaphysical truths,
Professor Goble's dilemma seems to be predicated upon a truncated
scientism. Such an assumption is essentially inadequate, not merely for
the philosophical and legal sciences, but also for the positive and physical
sciences. I shall attempt to clarify the above analysis of Professor Goble's
dilemma by the following commentary upon his reply to my criticism.
The substance of my criticism of Professor Goble's original thesis was
stated in the following topical sentences:
*A.B. (1928), A.M. (1929), Boston College; Ph. D., Gregorian University (1932);
S.T.L., Weston College (1935); LL.B., Georgetown University (1939); Professor of
Law, Loyola University School of Law, New Orleans, La.; former Dean, Boston
College Law School.
1 Goble, 41 A.B.A.J. 403 (1955).
2 Kenealy, I CATHOLiC LAWYER 259 (Oct. 1955).
3 Goble, 2 CATHOLiC LAWYER 226 (July 1956).
' Id. at 232.
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'Professor Goble sets up and rejects a con-
cept of natural law which would also be
repudiated by every classicist from Thomas
Aquinas to Heinrich Rommen. By "classi-
cists" I mean the scholars and spokesmen of
the traditional natural law philosophy as
expounded by the medieval scholastics and
the modern neo-scholastics. The concept re-
jected by Professor Goble differs essentially
from the classical concept in two funda-
mental and all-pervasive aspects: the very
meaning of the natural law, and its episte-
mological basis.5
In his reply, however, Professor Goble
states ". . . the primary target of my criticism
was the natural law which developed in
Europe in the 17th and 18th centuries and
was transported to the United States in the
18th and 19th centuries. Dean Pound called
this the 'classical natural law.' "6 He asks,
"Who is to say what is the classical natural
law?", and asserts, "Father Kenealy de-
scribed another system called natural law,
and then took great pains to show that my
criticism had no application to it, and fur-
ther that since it did not, it is obvious that I
do not understand his system." '7
Professor Goble has a good ad hominem
point here - but only if and insofar as his
arguments were aimed exclusively at his
"primary" target, the seventeenth-century
and eighteenth-century natural law, which
Dean Pound described and called classical.
But the Professor's arguments were not so
confined to his "primary" target. He dis-
charged a blunderbuss which scattered shot
at a more important and enduring target, the
traditional scholastic natural law, which I
termed classical.8 This seems fairly clear
5 Kenealy, supra note 2.
6 Goble, supra note'3.
7 Goble, supra note 3, at 227.
s I did so instinctively, I suppose, because of the an-
cient and unbroken development and tradition of
the philosophia perennis from the ancient Greeks
from the tenor of his original article, and
from the following statement in his reply:
Father Kenealy's system, as well as the
system described by Pound, encompasses
what are called "fundamental principles"
which are said to be "certain, immutable and
universal," and which are "antecedent, both
in logic and in nature, to the formation of
civil societies." To the extent that Father
Kenealy's system incorporates this view it
seems to me to be vulnerable to at least
some of the criticisms set forth in my ar-
ticle.9 (Italics added.)
Professor Goble expresses gratification at
my statement that his arguments have "con-
siderable relevance to the 'natural law' theo-
ries of Pufendorf, Thomasius, Hobbes, Spin-
oza and their followers of the seventeenth
and eighteenth centuries."'10 Nevertheless,
his reply reinforces my conviction that he
misses the meaning and the epistemology of
the traditional scholastic natural law.
I. THE MEANING
1. Referring to the fundamental principles
of the natural law, which are certain, univer-
sal and immutable, I had recited the familiar
doctrine that they "are generally divided
into a primary principle and its immediate
specifications, called secondary principles.
The primary principle is usually phrased in
such terms as 'What is good is to be done,
and what is evil is to be avoided.' "I' Com-
menting on this primary principle, Professor
Goble stated:
If we define "good" in general terms, that
and Romans through the medieval scholastics to
the modern neo-scholastics. This traditional school
still seems to me more deserving of the term
"classical" than its seventeenth- and eighteenth-
century off-shoots which perpetrated the various
"state of nature" theories.
9 Goble, The Dilemma of the Natural Law.
2 CATHOLIC LAWYER 226, 228 (July 1956).
10 Kenealy, Whose Natural Law?, 1 CATHOLIC
LAWYER 259, 261 (Oct. 1955).
11 Id. at 262.
is, without reference to particular acts, we
would have to say something like this, "good
is what one ought to do." But if we do that,
the principle becomes tautological, i.e., "one
ought to do what one ought to do." This can
hardly be said to be a principle at all. 12
But this is not the meaning of the primary
principle. The misconception lies in the con-
fusion of "good" and "ought." There are
many morally good acts which are not mor-
ally obligatory. There are works of super-
erogation. Heroic acts of charity are among
the more conspicuous examples. Surely,
Professor Goble is not morally obliged to
perform all possible morally good acts with-
in his power of choice. The concept of
"good" and the concept of "obligation"
must be sharply distinguished. The former
means suitability to being or nature; the
latter means necessity to end or destiny.
Generically, the morally good act means a
free act conformed to rational nature, per-
fective of human nature adequately con-
sidered (and therefore conducive to that
nature's end); the morally evil act means a
free act difformed from rational nature, de-
grading to human nature adequately con-
sidered (and therefore repulsive to that
nature's end). By human nature "adequate-
ly considered" is meant the operative human
being, considered in the light of the internal
harmony of his faculties and the external
harmony of his relations to his Creator and
his fellow creatures. By the end of human
nature is meant the fulfillment or perfection
of human being. By obligation is meant the
determination or moral necessity to that
end.
Therefore, while the primary principle
prohibits all evil acts, because they are nec-
essarily repugnant to the end, it does not
command all good acts, because, although
12 Goble, supra note 9, at 229.
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all are conducive, not all are necessary to
the end; but it does command all good acts
ontologically necessary to the attainment of
the end of man. The point is that "good"
and "ought" are nether identical in concept
nor coextensive in predication. The univer-
sality and immutability of the principle
emanates from the ontological universality
and immutability of human nature and the
ontological relation of human acts to human
destiny. The certain knowledge of the prin-
ciple is an epistemological matter which I
shall attempt to discuss later. It strikes me
as extremely significant, however, that Pro-
fessor Goble's formulation of the principle,
by identifying the "good" and the "ought,"
seems to indicate that he accepts as obvious
and evident (and, logically, also as universal
and immutable) that "good ought to be
done and evil avoided." If he does not, what
would the reason be for doubt, exception
or change?
2. In discussing the secondary principles
of the natural law, I had said:
As immediate specifications of the primary
principle, the secondary principles find fa-
miliar expression in the (still general) terms
of the Decalogue. The secondary principles
share the certainty, universality and immu-
tability of the primary principle.13
To which Professor Goble replied:
Suppose we consider the Commandment
"Thou shalt not kill." Notwithstanding the
literally clear, unqualified and unconditional
statement of this injunction, one may justi-
fiably kill another in self defense, in defense
of his family, or even in defense of a
stranger.... These are generally recognized
exceptions to the mandate "Thou shalt not
kill." But these exceptions are in no sense
"derived" from the rule, as Father Kenealy
seems to suggest. An exception which per-
13 Kenealy, supra note 10, at 262.
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mits killing cannot be "derived" from a rule
which says the exact opposite. 14
I do not wish to substitute adjective for
argument. But I am compelled to say that
this is a fantastic interpretation of a second-
ary principle of the natural liIw. It could
not have been suggested by any scholastic
treatise or manual. It is based upon a verbal-
ism'utterly alien to scholastic thinking. It
might make one wonder why Professor
Goble does not consider the swatting of a
mosquito or the plucking of a bluebell as an
"exception to the mandate." The cited "ex-
ceptions" are not exceptions at all to the
scholastic principle. I had used the expres-
sion, "the (still general) terms of the Deca-
logue," advisedly. The four monosyllables,
"Thou shalt not kill," merely indicate the
principle. The principle, in its negative as-
pect, prohibits the immoral killing or inflic-
tion of bodily harm upon self or other
human beings. In its positive aspect, it com-
mands the preservation of life and bodily
integrity of self and other human beings. As
a verbal formulation of the negative aspect,
I would suggest "Thou shalt not kill or in-
flict bodily harm upon any human being
unjustly."
Wherefore, acts of self-defense, defense
of others, warfare, executions for- crime,
corporal punishment, anesthesia, surgery,
v.accination, strenuous sports, and all other
bodily harms or risks of the same, which are
justifiable, are not exceptions to the prin-
.ciple. They are outside its prohibitions; in
fact, they may be within its commands. And
the justification of the act will depend upon
the norm of morality, i.e., conformity with
or difformity from human nature adequately
considered, and as specifically determined
by the nature of the act, the circumstances
14Goble, The Dilemma of the Natural Law,
2 CATHOLIC LAWYER 226, 230 (July 1956).
of the action, and the motive of the actor.
This is not to say or suggest that the deter-
mination of such moral problems is easy or
automatic. I had stated in my criticism of
Professor Goble's original article:
That natural law does not mean a closed
legal system, is evident from the fact that
the fundamental principles do not tell us
automatically in concrete applications what
is good or evil, just or unjust, wise or unwise;
what is idolatry, murder, theft, adultery,
perjury or calumny.15
Hence, it is quite true that the solution to
a question of justifiable self-defense is not
"derived" or deduced a priori from the prin-
ciple which demands justification for the
slaying of another. The solution of such
problems is what gives rise to the science of
morality - just as the difficulty of applying
principles (and rules) of law gives rise to
the science of law. Surely it is not true that
a principle (or even a rule) is meaningless
or useless because its application may be
difficult in particular cases. The phrase "due
process" indicates a legal principle (declar-
ing and enforcing a natural law principle)
of great difficulty in particular cases. But to
me it is of great meaning and moment that
the moral law, which says I may not be
deprived of life unjustly, is recognized and
enforced by the civil law, which says I may
not be deprived of life without due process
- and this despite the fact that, in close
cases, men and judges of reasonable but
finite mentalities, may differ about the appli-
cation of justice and due process. General
principles may not decide particular cases;
but particular cases cannot be decided with-
out them.
A possible clue to Professor Goble's mis-
understanding of natural law principles may
lie in his use of the terms "principle" and
15 Kenealy, Whose Natural Law?, 1 CATHOLIC
LAWYER 259, 262 (Oct. 1955).
"rule" interchangeably. He argues that prin-
ciples of natural law cannot be universal or
immutable, because rules of civil law obvi-
ously are not. 16 The argument is a non
sequitur because the terms do not mean the
same thing. A principle of natural law can
be known by man, because he can know his
own nature and essential relations; but the
principle cannot be made, changed or de-
stroyed by man, because he cannot make,
change or destroy' his essential nature;
wherefore a principle of the natural law is
universal and immutable as the essential
nature from which it emanates. But a rule
of civil law must be, made, and may be
changed or abrogated by man's legislative
or judicial process; wherefore 'a rule of the
civil law lacks the universality and immut-
ability of a principle of the natural law. This
is the reason why civil law enactments and
rulings should be consonant with principles
of natural law; it is why the natural law
constitutes a norm to measure the justice or
injustice of civil law.
Professor Goble cites, among others, the
rule of consideration in the law of Con-
tracts ;17 1 might add, to spread the field, the
rule of hearsay in Evidence, the rule of
witnesses in Wills, the rule of recording in
Property, the rule of strict liability in Torts,
the rule of "retreating to the wall" in Crimes,
the rule concerning self-incrimination in
Constitutional Law, and many others, from
the rules governing statutes of limitations all
the way down to traffic rules and minor
procedural regulations, As rules, they have
generality; but they are also subject to ex-
ceptions properly so called; and they may
require change, gradual or drastic, as time
and wisdom demand. For they are practical
16 Goble; supra note 14, at 228-236.
17 Goble, supra note 14, at 231.
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and subsidiary means, of more or less effi-
ciency, to enable government to apply the
great principles of the natural law to human
beings who live in the constantly changing
political, economic and social conditions of
civil society. I
3. A similar misunderstanding seems to
color Professor Goble's notion of the abso-
lute and inalienable rights involved in the
philosophy of the natural law. I had stated
in my article:
Natural law does indeed imply the exis-
tence of some human rights which are abso-
lute and inalienable, such as the right to life,
worship, marriage, property, labor, speech,
locomotion, assembly, reputation, etc. These
are absolute in the sense that they derive
from human nature; they are not mere hand-
outs from the state; the state is bound to
protect them and cannot destroy them even
though, by physical force, the state has
sometimes prevented their exercise. They
are not absolute in the sense that they are
unlimited in scope. It is a commonplace in
classical natural law philosophy that human
rights, even the most fundamental men-
tioned above, are limited. They are limited
in the sense that they are subject to specifi-
cation, qualification, expansion and contrac-
tion, and even forfeiture of exercise, as the
equal rights of others and the demands of
the common good from circumstance to cir-
cumstance, and from time to time, reason-
ably indicate. Human rights are absolute
only in the sense of the minimal require-
ments of a just and ordered liberty. But this
Is Cf. Fagan, The Goble-Kenealy Discussion -
Two Comments, 2 CATHOLIC LAWYER 324 (Oct.
1956). Professor Fagan seems to have missed the
context of my statement that some derivative prin-
ciples do not "share in the certainty, universality
and immutability of the fundamental principles."
Taken sensu composito, some derivatives plainly
do not have the certainty quoad nos. Moreover, I
was refuting the notion that natural law involved
a "closed legal system," indicating that many posi-
tive principles and practical rules, constructed un-
der the philosophy of the natural law, would
obviously not be certain, universal or immutable.
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is not the stuff of a closed system of immut-
ably "attained perfection". 19
To which Professor Goble replied:
It is simply linguistic gymnastics to say
in one breath that a principle is "certain,
universal and immutable" or that a right is
"absolute," and in the next that it is, never-
theless, subject to "qualification," "expan-
sion," "contraction" or "forfeiture." "Quali-
fication" and "contraction" include "excep-
tion," and an "exception" is an actual sub-
traction from the rule. Each exception
reduces the scope of the rule by the amount
of the exception, and therefore makes it ap-
ply to fewer situations. By any reasonable
definition this is a change in the rule itself.
... It seems to me that Father Kenealy has
paid a terrific price in semantics to make it
possible to say that his fundamental prin-
ciples are "certain, universal and immut-
able." 20
This reply confuses not merely principles
with rules, but both with rights. I stated
that the fundamental principles of the nat-
ural law are certain, universal and immut-
able; but I have never so described rules or
rights. A right is neither a principle nor a
rule. Generically, a right is an individual's
moral power to act, to omit, or to exact
something of another. It is a legal right when
that power is granted, or recognized as exist-
ing, by the civil law. It is a natural right
when that power emanates from human
nature itself, i.e., from essential human per-
sonality and destiny. Obviously, then, a right
may be both natural and legal. Now, I said
that natural rights "are absolute in the sense
that they derive from human nature, they
are not mere hand-outs from the state;" and
that the state "cannot destroy them," be-
cause the state is unable to destroy the
nature from which they emanate; and that
19 Kenealy, Whose Natural Law?, 1 CATHOLIC
LAWYER 259, 263-64 (Oct. 1955).
20Goble, The Dilemma of the Natural Law,
2 CATHOLIC LAWYER 226, 231-32 (July 1956).
the state "is bound to protect them," be-
cause it is for the purpose of securing these
rights that governments are instituted among
men. Nevertheless, I also said that natural
rights, which are absolute in the sense ex-
plained, are limited in scope, "in the sense
that they are subject to specification, quali-
fication, expansion and contraction, and
even forfeiture of exercise.. ." To Professor
Goble, this distinction is "simply linguistic
gymnastics."
They have blown the whistle on my ath-
letic days, but I do not think that the dis-
tinction requires particular agility, semantic
or otherwise. I shall attempt to illustrate
some typical limitations upon absolute nat-
ural rights. Life: may be forfeited by just
conviction of a capital crime, although even
then it would be retained as against private
necktie parties. Worship: may be qualified
by'reasonable restrictions as to time, place
and circumstance, and hence I may justly be
prevented from celebrating Mass when and
where I would block the necessary flow of
traffic, e.g., in the middle of Times Square.
Marriage: may be specified and qualified by
reasonable restrictions as to age and con-
sanguinity, etc.; but not, I believe, by so-
called miscegenation statutes, which seem
to me repugnant to the essence of the natural
right. Property: may be qualified, contracted
or expanded by reasonable zoning laws,
anti-trust regulations, wage and hour legis-
lation, etc. Labor: may be specified and qual-
ified by reasonable professional licensing
requirements, sanitary regulations, wage
and hour and conditions-of-work legisla-
tion, etc. Speech: may be qualified by rea-
sonable restrictions necessary, at least in
time of grave emergency or catastrophe, for
the common good. Locomotion: may be
specified, contracted or expanded by rea-
sonable passport rules, immigration laws,
etc.; and I do not mean the "national quota
system." Assembly: may be qualified by rea-
sonable requirements in the interest of pub-
lic health, safety and order. Reputation: may
be qualified by reasonable laws requiring
testimony in public trials, disclosure of em-
barrassing but contagious diseases, etc.
These are simply random examples of
limitations upon the scope of the absolute
natural rights which I had enumerated; but
they are typical of the limited scope which
is an attribute of all natural rights.
Is this "linguistic gymnastics?" I think
not. If the scope of natural rights were sub-
ject to unreasonable or arbitrary limitation,
either by the fiat of a dictator or the majority
vote of a democracy, then indeed they would
be subject to simple extinction and could not
be said to be absolute. But natural rights
still exist in Budapest, no matter how their
exercise is frustrated by civil law and brute
force, because the Hungarians are still hu-
man beings. If, however, the scope of nat-
ural rights is subject only to reasonable
limitation for the sake of the common good,
then indeed they are not subject to simple
extinction and can properly be said to be
absolute. Reasonable limitation of scope is
a "built-in" attribute of natural and inalien-
able rights.
For the human person, in his essential
nature, is not merely an individual being, he
is also a social being living with his fellows
in an external society which is subject to
political, economic, technological and social
change. Hence, his natural rights (and, of
course, obligations) are both individual and
social. To consider him solely as an indi-
vidual would lead to anarchy; to consider
him solely as a social unit would lead to
totalitarianism. But his individual-social
nature adequately considered leads to the
conclusion that his natural rights are abso-
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lute, in the sense explained, because he is
an individual for whose good governments
are instituted; and to the perfectly com-
patible' conclusion that his natural rights are
limited in scope, in the sense explained,
because he is also a social person obliged
by nature to contribute to the common good.
4. 1 had asked Professor Goble: "What
representative natural law philosopher or
spokesman held the principle that 'by nat-
ural law, freedom of contract could not be
interfered with by legislation'?" 21 To which
he replied:
This is a loaded question, because if I
name such a person, all Father Kenealy need
d:) is to say that my selection is not a "repre-
sentative" natural-law philosopher and he
will not be representative because he takes
that view. There were certainly a number
of judges who claimed to be natural-law
lawyers who held to the theory of the invi-
olability of freedom of contract. Justices
Chase, Field, Miller and Brewer may be
mentioned as among those who at various
times took this view. These judges were rep-
resentatives of the natural law of the nine-
teenth century, if not of the natural law of
Father Kenealy. 22
I had also asked Professor Goble: "...
[W]hat fundamental principle, what princi-
ple held to be certain, universal and immu-
table has been relinquished at any time by
devotees of the classical natural law? ' 2 To
which he replied:
This question is also impossible to answer
to Father Kenealy's satisfaction, because
any person I might name as having relin-
quished a fundamental principle of natural
law would by such relinquishment disqualify
himself as a "devotee" of Father Kenealy's
classical natural law .... In relation to this
question I would like to propose the name
of Judge Robert N. Wilkin as one who meets
21 Kenealy, supra note 19, at 263.
22 Goble, supra note 20, at 232.
23 Kenealy, Whose Natural Law?, I CATHOLIC
LAWYER 259, 262 (Oct. 1955).
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all of Father Kenealy's requirements for a
classical natural-law lawyer.2
4
'From these two replies, it would seem
that Professor Goble is somewhat wary of
my cauda Jesuitica. Unnecessarily, I trust.
The two questions were rhetorical, I sup-
pose, but they were not "loaded." The rhe-
toric expressed my conviction that no recog-
nized scholastic philosopher, or representa-
tive spokesman for scholastic natural law
philosophy, has ever taken the positions in-
dicated. But had Professor Goble surprised
me by naming a philosopher or spokesman
in point, I trust that I would have the candor
to admit it. I am interested in the philoso-
phy, which is quite independent of the aber-
rations of any particular philosopher. We
have sharpened the focus of our controversy
to the point where the laissez-faire nine-
teenth-century rugged individualism of Jus-
tices Chase, Field, Miller and Brewer are
not in issue. There remains the case of Judge
Wilkin to consider.
Judge Wilkin is listed by Harold Reusch-
lein 25 as a neo-scholastic. He wrote the
opinion in Hayes v. Crutcher,2 6 which Pro-
fessor Goble describes as follows:
In 1952, Judge Wilkin wrote a judicial
opinion in which he stated that since it is
contrary to nature for black birds, white
birds, red birds and blue birds to roost on
the same limb of a tree, it is contrary to
natural law for colored persons to have a
right to the use of a public golf course which
by city ordinance was limited to white per-
sons. "It seems" said the judge, "that segre-
gation is not only recognized in constitu-
tional law and judicial decision, but that it
is also supported by general principles of
natural law." 27
Without consciously deviating from my
24 Goble, The Dilemma of the Natural Law,
2 CATHOLIC LAWYER 226, 233 (July 1956).
25 Cf. REUSCHLEIN, JURISPRUDENCE 391 (1951).
28 108 F. Supp. 582 (M.D. Tenn. 1952).
27 Goble, supra note 24.
protestations of candor in controversy, and
despite Harold Reuschlein's listing, I do not
think that Judge Wilkin qualifies as a scho-
lastic philosopher or as a spokesman for that
philosophy. 28 However, for the sake of the
point in issue, let us suppose that he does.
What follows? I still ask "What fundamental
principle, what principle held to be certain,
universal and immutable has been relin-
quished" by Judge Wilkin? Although he
stated that, in his opinion, segregation was
"supported by general principles of natural
law," he was obviously making a particular
application of the principles (which he did
not name or describe) to a concrete case.
But I had already said:
, Natural law philosophers agree on the
fundamental principles of the natural law;
they differ on its derivative principles and
standards; and there is wide divergence of
opinion as to the concrete applications of its
derivative principles and standards to the
constantly changing political, economic, so-
cial and legal conditions of human society.
But what do such differences prove? Surely
not the invalidity of the fundamental phil-
osophy. Such differences prove that the area
of opinion is larger than the area of cer-
tainty ... 29
In fairness to Judge Wilkin, it should be
recalled that he wrote his opinion in 1952
as the judge of a lower federal court before
the Supreme Court overruled Plessy v.
Ferguson in the School Segregation Cases.
Nevertheless, it is unfortunate that his dicta
about birds attempted to link natural law
to segregation on golf courses. The answer
to Judge Wilkin seems to be that men are
not birds, and birds do not play golf. It
would be diverting, if somewhat. startling,
28 That Dean Reuschlein agrees with Father
Kenealy is evident from his comment on Judge
Wilkin's opinion in the Hayes case. 2 CATHOLIC
LAWYER 234 (July 1956).
29 Kenealy, Whose Natural Law?, I CATHOLIC
LAWYER 259, 265 (Oct. 1955).
to imagine the logical conclusions from a
premise that men should act like birds. It
appears that the Judge's argument about the
instinctive actions of our feathered friends
has no relevance to the rational conduct of
human beings at all, but is strictly for the
birds. My own opinion about the application
of natural law to the issue of compulsory
racial segregation is expressed elsewhere in
these pages.30
II. THE EPISTEMOLOGY
1. The epistemology 3 of scholastic phil-
osophy constitutes another stumbling block
for Professor Goble. It is something quite
mysterious. I had made the following state-
ment:
I infer that Professor Goble believes that
the epistemological basis of natural law phil-
osophy is: the criterion of truth is subjective
certitude or sincerity of subjective convic-
tion. This is. simply not true.... On the con-
trary, natural law philosophers unanimously
set up objective evidence as the criterion of
truth. The philosophers of various theories
of subjectiviim, .Descartes, Spinoza, Leib-
nitz, Berkeley, Hume and their followers are
again the.'express epistemological adversaries
of classical natural law. 32
To which Professor Goble replied:
These 'positive assertions by Father
Kenealy that immutable and universal prin-
ciples of natural law are established by "ob-
jective evidence" are mystifying. I know of
no scientific means, or trial and error pro-
cedures by which principles of law can be
determined to be immutable and universal.
How can it be established by objective evi-
dence that principles are good or bad for
society if we must accept them as immu-
tably created before there was any society?
33
30 Kenealy, Segregation-A Challenge to the Legal
Profession, 3 CATHOLIC LAWYER 37 (Jan. 1957).
31 Epistemology is the science of the methods and
grounds of knowledge, especially with reference
to its limits and validity.
32 Kenealy, supra note 29, at 264.
41 Goble, The Dilemma of the Natural Law,
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I had stated that "natural rights and ob-
ligations are inalienable precisely because
they are God-given. They are antecedent,
both in logic and in nature, to the formation
of civil societies. '3 4 Which drew this re-
sponse:
The proposition that certain legal princi-
ples are "antecedent, both in logic and in
nature, to the formation of civil societies"
seems to assume that the mind can reason
without experience - that it can by deduc-
tive logic reach conclusions about how men
ought to conduct themselves in society, be-
fore society exists, and therefore before
there are facts upon which reasoning can be
based. Psychologists, I believe, would deny
this. The mind cannot create knowledge. It
cannot think in a vacuum.3 5
Analyzing the above two quotations, and
their cited contexts, it seems to me that
Professor Goble is committed, explicitly or
implicitly, to the five following propositions:
a) That the immediate evidence, of the
fundamental principles of the natural law,
assumes "that the mind can reason without
experience." b) That the antecedence "in
logic and in nature," of inalienable rights to
the formation of civil societies, necessarily
means antecedence in time "before society
exists." c) That the only evidence constitut-
ing the criterion of truth is that specific to
the "scientific means, or trial and error pro-
cedures" of the positive and physical
sciences. d) That such procedures are com-
petent to determine whether or not the
fundamental principles of the natural law -
commanding good and prohibiting evil, for-
bidding unjust killings and the like - are,
as principles, "good or bad for society." e)
That such procedures are competent to test
the validity of the ultimate and necessary
2 CATHOLIC LAWYER 226, 228 (July 1956).
34 Kenealy, Whose Natural Law?, 1 CATHOLIC
LAWYER 259, 260 (Oct. 1955).
35 Goble, supra note 33, at 229.
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metaphysical premises of the positive and
physical sciences themselves. I shall attempt
to indicate why I think these five proposi-
tions are erroneous.
a) It is a fundamental axiom of scholastic
epistemology that "nihil est in intellectu nisi
prius aliquo modo in sensu," that is, nothing
can exist in the mind which has not been
previously in some manner in the senses.
Wherefore, a man who has never seen can-
not conceive a proper idea of color; a man
who has never heard cannot conceive a
proper idea of sound; and a man who had
never experienced any sensation, internal or
external, could not have any intellectual
idea at all. It is certainly true that the mind
cannot "create knowledge" or "think in a
vacuum."
Nevertheless, the senses supply only par-
ticular and material data, whereas the in-
tellect can abstract from such data ideas
which are universal and spiritual, e.g., the
idea of being, nature, end, relation, act,
potency, good, evil, right, obligation, prin-
ciple, controversy, premise, argument, con-
clusion, etc. Such universal ideas do not
exist, as universals, independently of an act
of the intellect; but they have a foundation
in objective reality, because they represent
reality as abstracted from particular objects
which do exist independently of an act of
the intellect. But the intellect can do much
more than apprehend ideas, it can also re-
flect, compare, reason, and form judgments;
judgments do not exist, as judgments, in-
dependently of an act of the intellect; but,
because they are predications of objective
reality, they will be true or false insofar as
they do or do not conform to the reality of
the object existing independently of the act
of judging. Hence, the criterion of truth
(and the motive of certitude) can only be
objective evidence, which may be defined as
the manifestation, to the judging intellect,
of the ontological necessity of the object to
be what it is . Accordingly, as the ontological
necessity of the object is metaphysical, phy-
sical or moral, the truth (and certitude) of
the judgment will be metaphysical, physical,
or moral. Moreover, as the manifestation of
that necessity does or does not depend upon
some previously known truth, the objective
evidence involved will be mediate or imme-
diate. For knowledge must begin some-
where. And all knowledge, both speculative
and practical, must depend upon some
immediately evident truths. Otherwise we
could never know anything, even probabili-
ties. But we certainly do know some things.
The scholastic doctrine, therefore, that
the fundamental principles of the natural
law are objectively and immediately evident,
does not "assume that the mind ican reason
without experience." It does not assert that
such principles are the first truths known by
men. It merely recognizes that such prin-
ciples constitute the basis upon. which all
truths of the practical moral order ultimately
depend.
b) Antecedence "in logic and in nature"
does not necessarily mean antecedence in
time "before society exists." Antecedence
means priority: in logic, priority of premise
to conclusion; in nature, priority of cause to
effect; in time, priority by the calendar or
clock. Inalienable natural rights are ante-
cedent in logic to society, because we argue
from what man's nature is to what society
should be; we do not argue from what so-
ciety is to what man's nature should be.
Inalienable natural rights are antecedent in
nature to society, because man's nature and
natural activities are the cause ofsociety,
sc., material, formal, efficient and final; man
makes society, society does not make man.
It is "to secure these rights" 'that "govern-
ments are instituted among men;" the Hun-
garians appreciate this. As to time, whether
man ever existed in a "state of nature," as
the seventeenth and eighteenth century phil-
osophers seem to have held, i.e., "before
society" existed, is disputed by most scien-
tists; but is completely immaterial to scho-
lastic doctrine and to my argument.
c) Nor is the evidence specific to the
"scientific means, or trial and error pro-
cedures" of the positive and physical sci-
ences the only evidence constituting the cri-
terion of truth. Such procedures, and their
specific evidence, have reference to the for-
mal objects of such sciences, sc., what is in
the positive and physical order. But we also
know some things about the normative and
metaphysical orders; we know something
about truth itself, about freedom, faith,
hope, love, prudence, justice, temperance,
fortitude, sacrifice, patriotism - which are
not the least components of the "good life"
of men and their societies. They are also the
objects of knowledge and, therefore, have
their own objective evidence.
d) Nor are such procedures competent
to determine whether or not the funda-
mental principles of the natural law - com-
manding good and prohibiting evil, forbid-
ding unjust killings and the like - are, as
principles, good or bad for society; because
the positive and physical sciences are not
normative. They study the "is" and not the
"ought;" they prescind from "values." They'
bring to light extremely important positive
and physical data which, however, must be
evaluated by the normative and metaphysi-
cal sciences.
e) Nor are such procedures competent to
test the validity of the ultimate and neces-
sary metaphysical premises of the positive
and physical sciences themselves. Among
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such premises are: the principle of contra-
diction, that a thing cannot be and not be
at the same time under the same aspect; the
principle of sufficient reason, that whatever
exists must have a sufficient reason for its
existence; the principle of causality, that
whatever exists contingently, or begins to be,
must have a cause of its existence; the exist-
ence of objective reality independent of the
human intellect; the capacity of the intellect
to know some reality; the difference between
truth and error, between certitude and prob-
ability, etc. These are metaphysical truths
necessarily presupposed by the positive and
physical sciences for the validation of their
own procedures and conclusions; they are
above and beyond the self-imposed formal
objects of such sciences. Moreover, such
premises cannot be "proved," in the sense
of proceeding from the known to the un-
known, because they are immediately evi-
dent; because the very attempt to "prove"
them supposes their truth - just as Profes-
sor Goble cannot "prove" to himself that he
exists, because any effort to do so would
suppose his existence. Nevertheless, such
metaphysical premises are the starting points
of all human knowledge. Every forward
march of science presupposes them, and
none can "prove," disprove or change them.
For, when properly understood, they are,
objectively and immediately evident as cer-
tain, universal and immutable truths.
The metaphysical truths indicated above
are among the first principles of the specu-
lative order; the fundamental principles of
the natural law are the first principles of the
practical order. This distinction is one of
convenience made because the same intel-
lect can know and reason about essences,
causes and effects, the "is" of necessary be-
ing, i.e., truths which are positive or specu-
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lative; and it can also know and reason
about conduct, means to ends, the "ought"
of physically free human actions, i.e., truths
which are normative or practical. The prim-
ary principle of the natural law is the basic
truth of the practical moral order, which is
supposed by all other truths of the same
order, and upon which their validity de-
pends. It is not known "without experience,"
nor is it the first truth known by the intellect.
For the intellect, considering man's rational
nature, his capacity for action, the conform-
ity ("goodness") of some acts to that nature,
the difformity ("badness") of other acts
from that nature, the fulfillment or perfec-
tion which is the end of that nature, the
necessity of attaining that end, the possi-
bility of frustrating the end, the relation of
attainment between good acts and the end,
the relation of frustration between bad acts
and the end, and the fact of the physical
freedom of man in action - considering
such things, the intellect cannot help but
see that man, although physically free, is
nevertheless morally obliged ("ought") to
do good and avoid evil.
The above sentence, of course, is not an
attempt to "prove" the primary principle.
Any such attempt, in the sense of moving
from the known to the unknown "ought,"
would be impossible; because it would
necessarily presuppose some logically prior
"ought;" but no logically prior "ought" can
be adduced, because there is none. The posi-
tive and physical sciences obviously cannot
adduce one, since they are concerned ex-
clusively with the "is;" and no one can get
an "ought" in front of a microscope or a
telescope. All men accept the primary prin-
ciple; none deny it. I am sure that Professor
Goble does not. For all men, no matter how
violently they may differ upon its application
to particular acts or concrete fact situations,
agree upon the basic truth that good should
be done and evil avoided. Its denial would
make futile any discussion of the moral
order, of good and evil, justice and injustice,
rights and obligations, due process and equal
protection, etc. Its denial, in fact, has been
incorporated into the insanity tests of civil-
ized criminal codes. And this is because the
primary principle, again when properly
understood, is objectively and immediately
evident as a certain, universal and immu-
table truth.
2. These qualities of the primary princi-
ple of the natural law are equally attribu-
table to its immediate specifications, the sec-
ondary principles, e.g., that one should not
unjustly kill another. Professor Goble, how-
ever, asks:
Assuming that a principle has always been
good and always will be good, how can that
fact be proved presently by "objective evi-
dence"? The only basis for a belief in the
validity of a principle before or after the
date of its verification by evidence is prob-
ability. ... To the extent that we project a
principle forward or backward beyond this
point of time, we rely solely on faith, but not
on objective evidence .... Science limits it-
self to stating its laws as probabilities or
plausibilities, and not as absolutes, univer-
sals or immutables. 36 (Italics supplied.)
Sincerely desiring not to be captious, it
is my turn to find Professor Goble's termi-
nology "mystifying." In the quotation above,
the "basis" for assent to a principle is vari-
ously referred to as "evidence," "probabil-
ity" and "faith." Faith I shall deal with later;
evidence is obviously the basis for assent; but
probability is never the basis for assent.
Probability and certitude are both qualities
of assent, which are determined by the qual-
36 Goble, The Dilemma of the Natural Law,
2 CATHOLIC LAWYER 226, 228-29 (July 1956).
ity of the evidence upon which the assent is
based. Moreover, although the possession
and use of truth is "good," it seems confus-
ing to refer to principles as "good" or bad,
rather than as true or false. Because "good-
ness," as the object of the will, is a quality
of actions, Whereas "truth," as the object of
the intellect, is a quality of judgments; and
principles are judgments. Hence, if I am
asked how a perennially true principle can
be proved presently by objective evidence,
I must reply: If it is a fundamental principle,
either in the speculative or in the practical
order, it can never be "proved" or "dis-
proved" in the past, present or future; it can
be seen, however, at any time, in the light
of its own immediate objective evidence. If
it is a non-fundamental principle, it can be
proved provided there is sufficient light from
mediate objective evidence, and the method
of proof will be deductive, inductive, or a
combination of both. And because truth is
objective and our minds are finite, there are
many truths which we do not now, and never
will, in this life at least, know or prove. But,
because truth is objective, whatever we do
or will know will be known by objective
evidence.
The context of the above quotation
stresses the fact that the "science" of Pro-
fessor Goble is positive science to the ex-
clusion of normative science. Hence, ignor-
ing the latter which deals with the moral
order, he argues from the former which, by
the self-denial of its formal object, has noth-
ing to do with the subject matter of the
present controversy.
3. Nevertheless, Professor Goble's refer-
ences to "faith" as the "basis" of assent to
a principle is intriguing. He repeats the idea
as follows:
My argument is based on the premise that
the qualities of "universality" and "immut-
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ability" of rules cannot be proved by objec-
tive evidence. The existence of these proper-
ties can be based only upon faith.37 (Italics
supplied.)
Assuming that he does not mean Divine
Faith, which would be irrelevant to this
philosophical controversy, I am puzzled as
to what he does mean. To me, faith means
assent to a proposition, not because of the
intrinsic objective evidence of the proposi-
tion itself, but because of the extrinsic au-
thority of the witness to the proposition. But
faith itself supposes objective evidence of
the existence, the competency, the veracity,
and the testimony of the witness; and upon
the objective evidence of these four things
will depend the quality of the assent to the
testified proposition. Therefore objective
evidence is always the ultimate criterion of
truth and the ultimate motive of certitude.
Natural law principles are not offered on
the authority of anybody. They stand or fall
on their own intrinsic and objective evi-
dence. Professor Goble's recurrence to
"faith" seems to stem from his desire to
uphold principles which cannot be proved
from positive science. That they cannot be
"proved" from positive science, I agree. But
I cannot agree that there is no objective evi-
dence outside of positive science. I would
have to take that proposition on "faith"
from Professor Goble. But I cannot, because
it is immediately and objectively evident
that, despite what I positively do, I "should"
do good and avoid evil. If Professor Goble
does not "know" this, but only "believes"
it, on whose authority does he believe it,
and why does he accept that authority?
4. Professor Goble states that principles
of natural law, rules of positive science, and
apparently all judgments, are "subjective"
37 Goble, supra note 36, at 232.
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and have "no existence except in the mind":
Basic to much that has been advanced in
this discussion is the view that a rule has no
objective existence in any other form than
as a group of spoken or written words, that
is, as a symbol. The idea or judgment which
the words symbolize is the important thing,
and it has no existence except in the mind.
The rule is therefore subjective and not ob-
jective .... Of course, conduct which results
from knowledge of the rule is objective, but
conduct in compliance with a rule, can
hardly be said to be the rule itself. 38 (Italics
supplied.)
With the statement that judgments are
more important than the words which sym-
bolize them, I agree; and I regret that Pro-
fessor Goble gave such importance to the
four symbols, "Thou shalt not kill," that he
missed the meaning of the principle which
they symbolize. Accordingly, despite the
symbols used above, I do not think that
Professor Goble is a philosophical subjec-
tivist. He agrees with the scholastic position
that objective reality exists independently of
an act of the mind, that the mind "cannot
create knowledge," that the mind "cannot
think in a vacuum," that the mind cannot
"reason without experience," and that the
positive sciences, at least, depend upon "ob-
jective evidence." Why, then, does he say
that judgments are "subjective" and have
"no existence except in the mind"? Judg-
ments are acts of the intellect purporting to,
represent objective reality. Precisely as vital
acts of the intellect, they are all, of course,
subjective. But from the standpoint of
human knowledge and all sciences they have
a much more important aspect: they are
purported representations of reality outside
the act and independent of it. False judg-
ments (men are birds), chimerical ideas
(square circles), figments of the imagination
as Goble, supra note 36, at 234.
(winged horses) and the like, do not repre-
sent objective reality existing independently
of the act which elicits them; they are purely
subjective, therefore, both as acts and as
representations. But true judgments (men
are not birds, they are rational animals)
do represent objective reality existing inde-
pendently of the act which elicits them.
Hence, as representations, they are reason-
ably, and more appropriately, called "ob-
jective." Similarly, the reality which objec-
tive judgments represent is reasonably and
appropriately called "objective truth." It is
essential to have a criterion of truth and
error; it is appropriate to have significant
terminology to separate the two. And "ob-
jective evidence," "objective truth," "ob-
jective judgments" square with the ordinary
uses of language, e.g., "Pay no attention,
it is just in his mind."
5. Professor Goble seems to believe that
adherence to the fundamental principles of
the natural law would hobble the pursuit of
truth and handicap the search for a better
society and a more efficient administration
of justice. He asserts:
It appears that Father Kenealy believes
that fundamental principles should not yield
to man's broader knowledge or deeper in-
sights, because he is sure that the funda-
mental principles man now has are "certain,
universal and immutable" and therefore per-
fect, and incapable of improvement. This
proposition I find myself unable to accept.
I.. it is my belief that in the search for truth
the mind should not be shackled by unveri-
fiable rules. 39
It is quite correct and logical to say that
the scholastic position is that "man's broader
knowledge or deeper insights" will never
prove that men should do evil and avoid
good, or kill one another unjustly, or be in-
different to either; just as the same broader
39 Goble, supra note 36, at 235, 236.
knowledge or deeper insights will never
prove that things can be and not be at the
same time under the same aspect, that things
can exist without a sufficient reason, that
contingent things can exist without a cause,
that objective reality does not exist inde-
pendently of an act of the human intellect,
that the mind can know nothing, that there
is no difference between truth and error,
between certitude and probability, etc. Far
from shackling the mind in its pursuit of
truth, these are the immediately and objec-
tively evident premises indispensable to the
pursuit of truth and the advance of human
knowledge. But they do not dispense with
the necessity for the pursuit or the hope of
the advance. Therefore I had said:
The construction and maintenance of a
corpus juris adequately implementing the
natural law is a monumental and perpetual
task demanding the constant devotion of the
best brains and the most mature scholarship
of the legal profession. For the fundamental
principles of the natural law, universal and
immutable as the human nature from which
they derive, require rational application to
the constantly changing political, economic
and social conditions of civil society. The
application of the natural law postulates
change as the circumstances of human exist-
ence change. It repudiates a naive and smug
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complacency in the status quo. It demands
a reasoned acceptance of the good, and a
rejection of the bad, in all that is new. It
commands a critical search for the better.
It requires an exhaustive scrutiny of all the
available data of history, politics, economics,
sociology, psychology, philosophy, and every
other pertinent font of human knowledge.
Of primary importance, it insists that the
search for a better corpus juris be made in
the light of the origin, nature, dignity and
destiny of man; and in the knowledge of
the origin, nature, purpose and limitations
of the state.40
This is a blueprint for pursuit, not a
shackle to search. Moreover it is a liberation
of the ethical and legal mind from the
limited confinement of purely positive sci-
ence. Hence, the distinction and reply which
I made in the beginning of this essay to
Professor Goble's dilemma.
In conclusion I am happy to record my
appreciation of the cordial spirit and schol-
arly manner in which Professor Goble has
responded to my criticism of his original
article. We both seek the truth. And we seek
it with the disadvantage of discordant termi-
nology. But we seek it also with the im-
portant advantage of mutual respect and
friendship.
40 Kenealy, Whose Natural Law?, I CATHOLIC
LAWYER 259, 260 (July 1956).
